(UE). — 70 years after the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), special note was taken this year of this event throughout Ukraine and the Ukrainian global community to honor Ukraine’s heroes only very few still living, to mark this unique era in Ukrainian history and to revisit the significance of this struggle within the context of the Ukrainian nation’s quest for statehood achieved only some twenty years ago and more than thirty years after the last known UPA operation.
The OUN-UPA is an often referred to singular term for the Ukrainian liberation struggle from 1929-50. From 1942 to 1950 these formations were inseparable. Without the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists there would not have been an UPA as we know it.
The UPA was nationwide phenomenon. However, the core of its first squads consisted of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. They were integral parts of one movement – The OUN”s structure even included an UPA Military Wing. A distinct format was used in order to attract non-OUN conscripts. At its peak the UPA’s personnel including auxiliary, consisted of some two hundred thousand people, including an armed underground as well as security services, communications, medical and sanitary service. A comparison of the number of members of UPA fighters, their organization and duration with other non-government partisan formations, would conclude that the UPA was not just a fighting guerrilla formation — in many respects it was a well-organized army albeit without a state.
Osyp Diakiw Hornovyj, a well-known participant and sometime ideologue of the OUN explained the connection between the two formations. The OUN with its prior activities established the moral preconditions for the formation of the UPA. The OUN also provided the UPA’s material resources The OUN addressed the issue of providing professionally trained officers for the UPA. Because of its revolutionary struggle against Hitler the OUN created the political conditions for the UPA. Members of the OUN organized the first units of the UPA. The OUN provided the blueprint and mission paper for organizing the UPA and protected the UPA. Many OUN members joined the UPA’s rank and file. OUN members joined officers training programs of the UPA. The OUN initiated and organized the UPA’s Western raids. Through the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) the OUN coordinated its activities with the UPA’s plans and bore the burden of providing food and other necessities to the UPA, while the organs of the Security Service (SB) of the OUN protected the UPA from foreign agent infiltration.
It was no simple coincidence that at the time of his heroic death the Commander-in–chief of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych was also Chairman of the OUN in Ukraine and Head of the UHVR Secretariat. Upon his demise these functions were taken over by his UPA next in command Wasyl Kuk.
Incidentally Stanislav Kulchitsky, head of the working group of historians in the state "Government commission studying the activities of the OUN and UPA" in his introduction to the 2005 work "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army"wrote:
"But the historical evaluation of the military formation, which was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and political force that created it - the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera), the problem is not yet resolved."
Kulchitsky essentially treats the OUN and the UPA as fundamentally one. However, he fails to denote the problem itself substantively and objectively. Perhaps, this is because the problem is not with the OUN-UPA but with the people who rule in current Ukraine, both in government and academia.
Traditionally, October 14, 1942, the feast of the Blessed Virgin Mary the Protectress, is often referred to as the date that the first UPA unit was formed. The year is accurate but the actual date is symbolic. The UPA declared this day its official holiday. Nevertheless it is an indisputable fact that in September and October 1942, a member of the OUN, Ostap began his work in the woods of Polissya (Northwest Ukraine) to form the first armed units to actively fight against the Nazi invaders. After a few months, these armed groups took shape as the first units of the UPA. These facts are supported in an order issued by the Commander- in- Chief of the UPA on October 14, 1947, ostensibly the fifth anniversary of the UPA's founding:
"Five years have elapsed since OUN member Ostap began to organize in Polissya armed units to fight the invaders of Ukraine. These small groups, fighting both the Germans and the Bolshevik partisans, have given rise to a new form of the liberation revolutionary movement – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. A few months later, this movement spread to all Polissya, Volyn, Galicia and most of the Right Bank. "
The OUN-UPA have been the subject of many treatises, research papers, articles, etc. as well as diatribes, and propaganda written by historians, journalists, political activists, propagandists, Ukrainian and foreign, friendly and hostile. A consideration of a few from non-Ukrainian sources seems worthwhile:
Canadian (American born) historian Paul Robert Magosci who has done extensive work on Ukraine and currently chairs Ukrainian studies at the University of Toronto, in his illustrated history on Ukraine provided a rather even overview on the UPA:
“Organized resistance began as early as the summer of 1941 among guerilla forces based in Volhynia and Polissia that claimed allegiance to the government -in-exile of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). The pro-UNR unit first directed its attacks against the retreating Soviet forces and then against the German invaders. By early 1942 the unit was renamed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and during the following months it was joined by other units formed from among Banderite and Melnykite factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) This rather loose coalition of underground forces (some of which often fought against each other as well as the common enemy) was in November 1943 brought under the control of the Banderite faction of the OUN. By 1944 the UPA had upwards of 100,000 soldiers under its command, and in July it established the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council which was to function as a provisional government until both German and Soviet troops were driven out and an independent Ukrainian state was established. That summer the UPA moved the center of its military operations fromVolhynia to Galicia, where it fought against both retreating German and advancing Soviet troops…In Galicia itself, it took until 1950 to eliminate the last sabotage activity carried out by the remaining supporters of the underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army.”
American historian Timothy Snyder, who is somewhat negatively disposed to the OUN-UPA because of a pro-Polish bias as well as rather incomplete research of Ukrainian nationalist ideology, also has written extensively on Ukraine and has included a significant amount on the OUN-UPA. In his work “The Reconstruction of Nations” in which he devoted much of his attention subjectively to UPA “atrocities” in Volhynia against the “peaceful Polish population”, he did offer a summary conclusion about the OUN-UPA in an analytical historical context rather than to disparage:
“Thus the OUN-Bandera, heretofore more significant in Galicia than Volhynia, began its major armed operations in Volhynia. Although the precipitant causes of the creation of the UPA were local and tactical, its purposes were global and strategic.”
Enemies of the OUN-UPA, aside from propagandists., have furnished a significant assessment and perspective on the OUN-UPA as well. In his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev, the General Secretary of the Communist party of the USSR wrote:
“Ukrainian nationalists gave us more trouble than anyone else between the signing of the treaty in 1939 and the outbreak of the war in 1941…When we moved into Lvov we made the mistake of releasing the Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera from prison...He was in prison in Lvov because he had been convicted in connection with the assassination of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs. We were hardly inclined to mourn the passing of a minister of the reactionary Polish state. Nevertheless we still showed a certain lack of judgment by freeing people like Bandera from prison without first checking up on them. We were impressed by Bandera’s record as an opponent of the Polish government, but we should have taken into account the fact that men like him were also enemies of the Soviet Union. They were Ukrainian nationalists and therefore had a pathological hatred of the Soviet regime…During the second half of the war he fought against both us and the Germans. Later, after the war, we lost thousands of men in a bitter struggle between the Ukrainian nationalists and the forces of Soviet Power.”.
Another mortal enemy of the OUN-UPA was Pavel Sudoplatov. He had been deputy director of Soviet Foreign Intelligence from 1939 until 1942, then he was appointed the director of the Administration of Special Tasks, then the director of the Fourth Directorate. His assessment of the Ukrainian nationalist struggle during and after World War 2 was expressed in his memoirs published in 1994:
“The Ukrainian nationalist organizations headed by followers of Bandera, were active, influential, and very strong and enjoyed significant support from the local population. Besides, they were very experienced in conspiracy…”
About the Commander-in-chief of the UPA, Sudoplatov wrote:
“We established that the armed resistance was coordinated by Roman Shukheyevich(sic)…He was a bold man, competent in clandestine work, who remained active for seven years after the departure of the Germans.”
He went on to relate the killing of Shukhevych:
“We surrounded the building, and Drozdov demanded that Shukheyevich (sic) lay down his arms, guaranteeing his life on behalf of the Ukrainian socialist government. Automatic fire was the reply. Shukheyevich (sic) threw two hand grenades and, accompanied by two women, all armed attempted to break out. In the combat Shukheyevich (sic) and two of our officers were killed.”
Following the Second World War, The New York Times carried several articles about the Ukrainian nationalist’ struggle. On September 19, 1947, The New York Times wrote:
”A United States Army report said today the Ukrainian resistance army fighting for Ukrainian independence was so large that units estimated to number between 15,000 and 20,000 men had engaged Polish and Soviet troops in pitched battles.”
The article went on to describe that the partisans were armed with mortars, light artillery and machine guns as well as rifles and hand grenades.
Some two years later on May 14, 1949 The New York Times wrote that two divisions of Soviet troops in Ukraine were “aiding local police forces in intermittent but bloody warfare against anti-communist guerrillas.” The New York Times went on, offering an assessment of the struggle in Ukraine:
“The Ukraine always has been a hot-bed of dissidence in Soviet Russia (sic), and the nationalist and separatist tendency of this region has never been completely crushed by the Moscow regime…During and after the German wartime invasion, the region was torn by civil strife, and the Ukrainian insurgent army, or the so-called UPA, became a very sizable force. In 1947, the Kremlin sent Lazar Kaganovitch, dubbed the “Iron Commissar,” to the Ukraine to repress the rebellion, and his purges and executions, together with strong combined military measures by Russia, Czechoslovakia and Poland cut down severely the strength of the UPA. The pitched battles that sometimes occurred two years ago between the UPA and MVD (secret police) troops no longer occur, it is understood, but the UPA, though weakened, still carries out periodic raids, and serves as the nucleus of a fairly extensive Ukrainian underground.”
In its struggle with the OUN-UPA after World War 2, the Soviets employed police and military forces. Their enemy was not only UPA soldiers or OUN members. Some 500,000 Ukrainians were repressed for OUN-UPA connections, some merely because they provided a bowl of soup to a person under suspicion. The Soviet gulags were filled beyond capacity with Ukrainian political prisoners.
Just after the war, the general staff of the UPA issued an appeal to all Ukrainians who had been interned or exiled:
“Wherever you are, in the mines, the forest or the camps, always remain what you have formerly been, remain true Ukrainians and continue our fight.”
The role of the OUN-UPA in Soviet camps was significant and dramatic. Leading OUN members such as Kateryna Zarytska and Mykhaylo Soroka or Yuriy Shukhevych, the son of the Commander-in-chief of the UPA, who were interned became symbols of resistance in camps and prisons.
American journalist Anne Applebaum in her book "Gulag" noted, in particular, Ukrainian political prisoners. She indicated that by far the most influential ethnic groups in the camps were Ukrainians and Balts. Their influence was both in their large numbers and their open opposition to the Soviet Union. Ms. Applebaum offered as an example of Ukrainian organization and discipline, a specific event the “Kingir uprising” in one of the Kazakhstan camps:
“As in other camps, the prisoners of Steplag were organized by nationality. Steplag’s Ukrainians, however, appear to have taken their organization a few steps farther into conspiracy. Instead of openly choosing leaders, the Ukrainians formed a conspiratorial “Center,” a secret group whose membership never became publicly known, and probably contained representatives of all of the camp’s nationalities. By the time the thieves arrived in the camp, the Center had already started to produce weapons – makeshift knives, clubs and picks – in the camp workshops, and were in contact with the prisoners of the two neighboring lagpunkts, No 1 – a zona for women – and No. 2. Perhaps these tough politicals impressed the thieves with their handiwork, or perhaps they terrified them. In any case, all agree that at a midnight meeting, representatives of both groups, criminal and political shook hands and agreed to unite.”
Ms. Applebaum then went on to narrate the events of the actual uprising which further marked the distinction of the Ukrainian prisoners:
“On May 16, (1954 ASL) this cooperation bore its first fruit. That afternoon, a large group of prisoners in lagpunkt No. 3 began to destroy the stone wall which separated their camp from the other two neighboring camps, and from the service yard, which contained both the camp workshops and the warehouses. In an earlier era, their aim would have been rape. Now, with Ukrainian nationalist partisans, male and female, on both sides of the wall, the men believed themselves to be coming to the aid of their women-their relatives, friends, or even spouses.”
Ms. Applebaum described the subsequent strike, concluded that the strike committee had been chosen by the “Center” and assessed that the Ukrainians behaved as if they were united by some “organization.”
The legacy of the OUN-UPA translated in Soviet society into a jargon and colloquialism that denoted hostility especially from the Russian segment of society. Ukrainian patriots in everyday life were referred to as “Bandiory” or “Banderivci”. Ivan Dziuba, one of the more noteworthy dissidents in the Soviet Union in his seminal publication “Internationalism or Russification” cited this in one of his illustrated events:
“When in 1963 the Young Writers’ and Artists’ Club decided to honor the memory of Ivan Franko and organized a torchlight procession to his monument you could hear Russian interjections from the crowd along Kiev’s main street: ‘Look! Banderists!(sic) What a lot of them!’”
This appellation has survived even today. While the connotation remains hostile on the part of those who label Ukrainian patriots thus, the Ukrainians so labeled have accepted the term as a badge of honor.
Today Ukraine is officially an independent state. In fact, Ukraine features almost all the attributes affiliated with sovereignty: a defined territory, an official language, its own armed forces and foreign policy. However, these attributes are misleading. Russia and Russians, more than once since the independence proclamation, have leveled claims against Ukrainian territory. Other nationalities, Poles, Romanians even Hungarians have done likewise although to a much lesser extent. The recently enacted language policy legislation, if widely implemented, would render the Constitutional clause denoting Ukrainian as the state language largely meaningless. Russian armed forces are based on Ukrainian territory. Foreign policy is in the hands of a president who is an ex-convict with no foreign policy credentials and a foreign minister who is a product of the Moscow school of diplomacy. Those responsible for education, national memory and historical archives are Tabachnyk, Soldatenko and Ginsburg. Moscow could not have chosen more anti-Ukrainian candidates if these people had been hired by Putin himself. It is a credit to the Ukrainian spirit that despite this environment Ukrainian society is patriotic generally. The problem is exacerbated by the ruling oligarchs who perpetuate their rule through corruption and fraud.
What saves Ukrainians and their national identity is their history, in particular their heroic struggle for independence before, during, and long after the Second World War. In this regard the OUN-UPA was the leading player and remains legendary today. Case in point: the 70th anniversary of the formation of the UPA was widely observed on October 14, 2012 and at other times throughout Ukraine, of course in Lviv, but also in the center and capital Kyiv and even in Kharkiv, the initial capital of the Ukrainian SSR and still heavily Russified, with no government support in general, and often despite government opposition and interference. Numerous groups in Ukraine including a political party which garnered more than 10% in the recent parliamentary election, boast of being the bearers of the OUN-UPA mantle. This OUN-UPA legacy is very much alive within a nation which has few peers, if any, in terms of historical suffering and attempts to remove it from the face of the earth.
And so Ukrainians persevere and now have a country which is becoming more their own. It seems inevitable that the OUN-UPA will form the vanguard of a future pantheon of Ukraine's true heroes.
