THE 1,025TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BAPTISM OF KYIVAN RUS
July 30, 2013
The Economist
UNLIKE its western counterpart, eastern Christianity has always maintained close ties to the state. But the visit to Kyiv on July 27th of Patriarch Kirill I of the Russian Orthodox Church and Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, took the concept to a new level. Celebrating the 1,025th anniversary of the baptism of Kyivan Rus, a medieval federation of eastern Slavic princedoms, both sent a clear message: Don’t stray from the common space of our Russian-Orthodox civilisation.
The event took place amid rising concerns in Russia over Ukraine’s future. European Union officials hope to sign an Association Agreement with the post-Soviet nation at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in November this year. If the agreement comes into force, a recent report from Chatham House, a think tank in London, argues, this could mean “game over for Russia”.
To prevent this outcome Moscow has extended both carrots and sticks, most recently warning Ukraine it would lose its observer status in the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which accounts for over a third of its exports. Cheap gas and open borders are promised for full membership, which would likely doom any hopes of European integration.
The message was again hammered home on July 27th by Mr Putin, who noted that Ukraine’s trade with Russia was down 18% this year, while it increased by 2-3 % within the Moscow-led trade bloc. “There is tough competition going on for the global markets. And I am sure most of you realise that only by joining forces we can be competitive and win in this rather tough struggle,” Mr Putin said.
Yet the visit was mostly about soft power, not hard politics. The Kremlin is more comfortable with trade bans and realpolitik, argues Arkady Moshes from the Finnish Institute for International Affairs, a think tank, but you can only go so far with money and cheap gas. Russia has nothing that would resemble its former leadership in terms of ideas: pan-Slavism in the 19th century and communism in the 20th. “The Kremlin is clearly in search of a new ideological construct,” Mr Moshes says.
One answer has been raising the profile of Rossotrudnichestvo, a federal agency charged with promoting friendly relations abroad, which received a big spending boost just last week and is expected to see its budget grow fivefold by 2020.
Even more important, at least symbolically, is promoting the ideological concept of the Russkiy Mir, or Russian World, which places Moscow at the center of the Orthodox civilisation of largely Russian-speaking nations. At its core are the three eastern Slavic states, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, which Kirill I, the movement’s unofficial leader, believes must maintain spiritual and cultural unity under the Russian Orthodox Church.
This construct fulfills both domestic and international goals. On the home front, it moves beyond the broken promise of law and order that brought Mr Putin to power after the chaotic 1990s, focusing on conservative values instead. Internationally, it places Russia at the centre of a major world civilisation, cementing its role as a global power.
Home to the world’s second biggest Orthodox population and the mythological birthplace of the Russian nation, Ukraine is critical to the project’s success. The very name of Russia comes from Kyivan Rus, appropriated by the Duchy of Muscovy in the 16th century along with the spiritual heritage. “Ukraine is most important, it is the centerpiece,” says Mr Moshes.
Just how successful Russia’s arguments will be is another question. Many Ukrainians see this as yet another Muscovite attempt to steal parts of their culture and stamp out the rest. Viewed as a renegade by Moscow, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate was not invited to the events. Perhaps fittingly, members of the Russian delegation wore badges celebrating the Baptism of Rus, with the word “Kyivan” omitted.
A further weakness of the Russian strategy is that it looks back, not forward. To be effective, soft power should be based on some promise of future prosperity: EU membership comes with prospects of rising living standards; America aims to spread liberal democracy. The idea of the Russian World only looks to a common past, with little to say about the future.
But this does not mean Moscow has no plans for the present. Already on July 29th Russian regulators banned sweets produced by Roshen, a Ukrainian confectionary giant. Even when the Kremlin tries to coax neighbours with soft power, it appears, a hard stick is never far behind.
